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The slable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner lhat rLo 
two unmatched agents prefer each other to their inates. V~'e stablish three resulls on properties 
of these matchings and present wo short proofs of a recent heorem of Dubins and Vreedman. 
1. Introduction 
The prob lem of  our  t it le was in t roduced by Ga le  and  Shap ley  [2] in 1962. Since 
then,  it has been the sub ject  o f  numerous  research  art ic les and  even a short  book  
(Knuth  1976 [3]). The  prob lem cont inues  to be o f  interest  as a rare ins tance  of  an 
exercise in 'pure '  mathemat ics  (combinator ia l  theory  of  o rdered  sets) which is ac- 
tua l ly  beng appl ied  to real wor ld  s i tuat ions  (ass ign ing medica l  schoo l  g raduates  to 
hosp i ta ls ) .  
In the next sect ion,  we recall  the prob lem br ief ly  and  remark  on some of  its 
h is tory .  The  rest o f  the  paper  is devoted  to prov ing  three  new results  and  giv ing new 
proofs  of  a recent result  o f  Dub ins  and  F reedman [1]. 
2. The problem, some history, results 
The prob lem of  'co l lege admiss ions '  as descr ibed  in [2] invo lves  a set of  inst i tu-  
t ions  and a set o f  appl icants .  Each  app l i cant  lists in o rder  of  p re ference  those inst i tu-  
l ions he wishes to a t tend  and  each ins t i tu t ion  lists in order  o f  p re ference  those  ap-  
p l i cants  it is wi l l ing to admi t .  In add i t ion ,  each ins t i tu t ion  has a quota  giv ing an up- 
per  bound on  the number  of  app l i cants  it can admi t .  The  prob lem is then  to devise 
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some method of assigning applicants to institutions in a way which takes account 
of  their respective preferences. The key notion turns out to be that of  stabilio'. An 
assignment is said to exhibit instabilio, it" there is an applicant ce and an institution 
1 such that a prefers l to  the institution to which he is assigned and I either has not 
filled its quota or if it has, it prefers :x to some other applicant wlao is assigned to 
it. An assignment or matching, as we shall call it, is stable if it does not exhibit in- 
stability. Question: given any set of applicants and institutions, together with their 
preferences and quotas, can one always find a stable matching? An affirmative 
answer is given in [2]. The proof  is constructed by means of a simple algorithm 
which starting from the given preference data arrives at a stable matching (in a 
number of  steps roughly proportional to the square of  the number of  applicants and 
institutions). The matching obtained in this way turns out to have the rather surpris- 
ing property that it is the unique stable matching (there may be many) which is 
preferred by all the applicants to any other such matching. 
The above paragraph summarizes the content of  [2]. The question of  course then 
arises as to whether these results can be applied 'in practice'. The authors of  [2] had 
expressed some reservation on this point, - and then came another surprise. Not on- 
ly could the method be applied, it already had been more than ten years earlier! The 
National Resident Matching Program (located in Evanston, Illinois, founded in 
1951) has the task each year of  assigning raduates of  all the medical schools in the 
country to hospitals where they are required to serve a year's residency. The method 
uses by NRMP to do this is exactly the one described in [2] but 'in reverse', that 
is, the matching obtained is hospital rather than applicant-optimal nd hence it is 
the worst, rather than the best stable matching from the point of  view of the 
students. The two algorithms are easy to describe. 
NRMP-A lgorithm 
Each hospital H tentatively admits its quota qH consisting of  the top qH appli- 
cants on its list. Applicants who are tentatively admitted to more than one hospital 
tentatively accept he one they prefer. Their names are then removed from the lists 
of  all other hospitals which have tentatively admitted them. This gives the first ten- 
tative matching. Hospitals which now fall short of  their quota again admit tentative- 
ly until either their quotas are again filled or they have exhausted their list. Admitted 
applicants again reject all but their favorite hospital, giving the second tentative 
matching, etc. The algorithm terminates when, after some tentative matching, no 
hospitals can admit any more applicants either because their quota is full or they 
have exhausted their list. The tentative matching then becomes permanent. 
Gale-Shapley (G-S)-Algorithm 
Each applicant petitions for admission to his/her favorite hospital. In general, 
some hospitals will have more petitioners than allowed by their quota. Such over- 
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subscribed hospitals now reject the lowest petitioners on their preference list so as 
to come within their quota. This is the first tentative matching. Next, rejected ap- 
plicants petition for admission to their second favorite hospital and again oversub- 
scribed hospitals reject the overflow, etc. The algorithm terminates when every ap- 
plicant is tentatively admitted or has been rejected by every hospital on his list. 
The simplest examples (two applicants, two hospitals) show that the two algo- 
rithms need not give the same result. We do not know whether NRMP chose the 
hospital-optimal method as a matter of  policy or whether they were not aware of  
the alternative possibility. In any case, the discrepancy between the two methods 
leads at once to the first result of this paper which asserts: 
l.et H be any stable matching, let S(H) be the set qf  applicants admitted to some 
hoapital and let ntt(H) be the number o f  applicants admitted to hospital H. Then 
the set S(H) and numbers nz4(It) are the same for  all stable H. 
In words, although NRMP is worse then G-S for students, it is at least true that 
any student admitted under G-S will be admitted to some hospital under NRMP.  
Further, though G-S is worse than NRMP for hospitals, it is still true thai each 
hospital will fill the same fraction of  its quota in both cases. This result does not 
seem obvious although, as we will see, its proof  is quite simple. 
Our second result is concerned with the question of what happens to the matching 
it" an institution (applicant) extends the list of  applicants (institutions) it is willing 
to accept (enter). Intuitively, one feels that if an institution extends its list, this 
would be good for the applicants but, possibly, bad for the other institutions. Intui- 
tion turns out to be right in the case but the proof  is not so easy. We have: 
Whether one uses the applicant-optimal (G-S) or institution-optimal (NRMP) 
matching, it will always be the case that i fan  institution extends its list no applicant 
will be made worse of f  and no institution will be made better of  J: 
Our third result shows that the applicant optimal matching is 'Pareto optimal'  for 
the applicants. That is, there is no matching, stable or not, which is better for all 
applicants than the applicant-optimal matching. 
Several years ago Dubins and Freedman [1] showed that the applicant-optimal 
matching was 'cheat-proof '  or the applicants. This means the following: suppose 
all preference data is available to all applicants and institutions. One can imagine 
then that some clever applicant or institution could take advantage of this by suit- 
ably falsifying their own preference data in such a way that the final matching would 
be better for them than if they had been honest. It is shown in [1], by an example, 
that this is indeed true for the institutions but not for the applicants. More precisely, 
no set of applicants by falsifying preferences can force a matching which is preferred 
by all applicants in the set. The proof  in [1] is quite long. In the final section, we 
give a shorter proof  of this result, using only the properties of stability and 
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appl icant-opt imal i ty.  In an appendix,  we give an even shorter proof  of the resuh 
which, however, makes use of the G-S matching algorithm (as did the proof  o l  
Dubins and Freedman).  
It is interesting to note that these last two results do not hold for the institution 
opt imal  matching. Roth [4] has given an example involving 3 institutions and 4 ap- 
plicants in which there is a matching which is preferred by all institutions to the 
inst i tut ion-opt imal  matching and further the institutions can force this matching b3 
falsifying their preferences. 
3. The model 
As in previous treatments of  the problem, we begin by reducing it to the special 
case in which each institution has a quota of  one. This is done by the following 
device: we replace institution ,4 by q~t copies of" ,4 denoted by Al , ,4  ~ . . . . .  ` 4~/," 
Each of  these ,4~ has preferences identical with those of  ,4 but with a quota of I. 
Further,  each appl icant who has ,4 on his preference list now replaces `4 by the string 
`4~,,4~,...,,4q~ in that order of  preference. It is now easy to verify that the stable 
matchings for the original problem are in natural  one-to-one correspondence with 
the stable matchings of this modi f ied model.  With this modif icat ion,  the model 
becomes completely symmetric in the appl icants and institutions. To reflect this, we 
make the usual change of  scenario to that of  the 'stable marr iage problem'  in which 
instead of  appl icants and institutions, we consider men and women and think of  the 
matchings as (monogamous)  marriages. 
We now give the formal presentat ion of the model.  There are two sets M and 14" 
(men and women).  We assume that each man m in M has a total (preference) order- 
ing Pm on the set WU {m},  the set of  all women and himself. The posit ion in which 
he places himself  in the ordering has the meaning that the only women he is willing 
to be matched with are those whom he prefers to himself. This formulat ion turns 
out to be convenient for our analysis. Similarly, each w in W has a total ordering 
P ,  on the set MU {w}. We write w 7,,~ w' to mean m prefers w to w'. Similarly, we 
write m >,. m'.  We say that w is acceptable to m if w >,,, m and analogously for 14". 
A pair (m, w) is compat ib le  if each is acceptable to the other. The sets M and It' 
together with the orderings will be called a preference structure,  denoted by /L 
We will need one more concept. As mentioned earlier, we will be interested in 
studying the effect on stable matchings when a man or woman extends his or her 
list of  acceptable people, in our formulat ion,  this corresponds to people changing 
their own posit ion in their preference ordering. We will write P~,~ >~ P,,7 if m has 
possibly lowered his own posit ion in the ordering on WU {m} leaving the ordering 
unchanged otherwise. Similarly, we define P~,. E P,. ,  and finally we write f"~>.w j' 
if P~,; ~> P,,; for all rn in M. 
We now turn to the matter of matchings. In general, it will not be possible to 
match all of M and W. We therefore make the convention that a person who is not 
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matched to someone of the opposite sex is matched with him/herself. Formally, we 
havc 
Definition. A matching 12 is a function from the set M U W onto itself of  order two, 
(lhat is, 12e(x)-x) such that if 12(,v)*x, then {x, 12(x)} is a compatible pair. We refer 
to 12(x) as the mate of x. 
There are two natural partial orders on the set of  all matcbings. If 12 and 12' are 
distinct matchings, we write 12 >w12' if/A(m) k,,,12'(m) for all m in M. Similarly, we 
define 12 >,  12'. 
I1" 12 and i*' are matchings, the function v 12V.wl 2 '  is defined by v (m) -  
max(12(m), g'(m)) and v(w)= min(12(w),/l'(w)). In general, v will not be a matching. 
The function r/-12 Vu12' is defined analogously (notice that 12 vw/~' is the same as 
!, Awl  2 '  in the usual lattice notation). 
Key Definilion. If 12 is a matching, we say that the pair (m, w) blocks 12 if tn and 
w prefer each other to their mates, that is, w >,,,12(m) and m >,,12(w). A matching 
is slable if it is not blocked by any pair. 
4. Properties of stable matehings 
In this section, we prove the first and second theorem described in Section 2. 
l~emma 1 (Decomposition). Let ~ and ~" be preference structures with ~>'kw ~' 
and let 12 and t2' be corresponding stable matchings. Let Mr, (M,,,) be all men who 
prefer f~ to 12' (12' to ll) and define W,,, and W,, analogousO,. Then 12' and 12 are 
b~iections between MI,, and I4",,. 
Proof.  Suppose m e Mr,,. Then /~'(m) >,,, 12(m) >,,, m so 12'(m) e W since 12' >,,, 12. 
Setting w-12'(m), we cannot have 12'(w) >,/t(w) for then (m, w) would block 12. 
ttence, we IV,, and we have 
12'(M,,,) c I4~, (1) 
On the other hand, if we Wj,, then 12(W)>w12'(w)k,.w so 12(w)eM. Letting 
l.'(w) m, we see that we cannot have 12(m)>,,,12'(m) or (m, w) would block 12'. 
Hence, 
~( w,,)cM~,,. (2) 
Since 12 and /a' are injective and M,,, and IV,, are finite, the conclusion fol- 
lows. I] 
Corollary 1. 12'>M~ i f  and only t:f12 >w12'. 
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,> Proof. It MP if and only if Mz, is empty, so p and It' agree on M-M~,.  and 
W-  W,, which is equivalent o It >wit'. ! 
For the special case where J '=  ~' ,  the corollary states that the orders >M and 
>w are inverses of  each other. 
Our first result is an immediate consequence of the lemma. 
Theorem 1. The set of  people who are matched with themselves i  the same for  all 
stable matchings. 
Proof.  Suppose, say, m was matched under p '  but not under p (assume now 
¢ '= •#'). Then m e M~,, but from the lemma, It maps W~ onto M,,, so m is also 
matched under p, contradiction. 71 
Lemma 2. With assumptions and notations o f  Lemma 1, we have 
v =p VMit' is a matching and is stable for  < 
~1 =p vwp '  is a matching and is stable for  ~". 
(3) 
(4) 
Proof. By definition, p VMp' must agree with It' on M~,, and IV,, and with It 
otherwise. By Lemma 1, v is therefore bijective. Further, for meMf , ,  
l l ' (m)  >mit(m)~m in :~ so It' is a permissible matching in ~0. Suppose now that 
some (m,w) blocks v and memo,, so W>mP'(m). Then certainly w>,nit(m) so if 
we  IV,,, then m >wp'(w) and p '  would be blocked, and if we  IV -  IVy, then m >~, 
p(w) and It would be blocked. On the other hand, if meM-M~, ,  then 
m >,, i t(m)kmit '(m) so (m, w) would block p or It' according as w is in 14/- W,~ or 
W,. This proves (3). 
Next, we have r/ agrees with It on IV~UM/,, and with It' otherwise. Again, r/ is a 
matching from Lemma 1. The stability argument is as in the previous para- 
graph, i 
Corollary 2 (Conway-Knuth).  The set of  stable matchings for  ~ Jorm a lattice. 
Proof. Take '/"= J~ above. [ 
Corol lary 3. There are stable matchings Pa4 (uw) preferred by all man (women) to 
any other stable matching. 
Proof.  Every finite lattice has a maximum and minimum element. I] 
Corollary 3, also proved by a different method in [2], is especially surprising when 
applied to the original model with applicants and institutions. It says that if the 
institution-optimal matching is used (as in the case of  NRMP),  then the applicants 
that each institution gets are 'preferred' by that institution to those applicants it 
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would get under any other stable matching. Thus, suppose institution A gets ap- 
plicants cf I )',40'2"'" ~>,dlTk under the institution-optimal matching and A gets 
/)'t >,~ f12"" >1//~ under some other stable matching. Then of I ~A ./~1, 0f2 ~,4 /~2 . . . . .  
This is a very strong form of optimality. 
The matchings/~M and/~w are called the M-optimal and W-optimal matchings. 
We now prove our second main result. 
Theorem 2. Suppose  e"k  M I/" and let lt'~t, It M and l*u, It,, be corresponding op- 
timal matchings. Then 
and 
la~lk,~tla,{t (so Ia'~tku,la/vl, Corollary I) (5) 
l~irku'lzw (so lawk,4/a'w, Corollary 1). (6) 
In words', the men are better o f f  and women worse o f f  under ~ than under J~' 
no matter which o f  the two optimal matchings are used. 
Proof.  By Lemma 2, /~MVM/J'~t is / -stable so  l l : v lkS i l~MVMl l , '~ lk~l l l ' v l  . 
Also, by Lemma 2, /~wV~/~. is #'-stable so lA~rku, l twV,. l l~r>~wl~,. .  1 
5. Parelo optimality t
We wish to show that there is no matching/a which is (strictly) preferred by all 
men to the matching ,u.~. To prove this, we introduce some terminology. If p is a 
matching, we say that m admires w if m and w are compatible and m prefers w to 
his mate/a(m) (thus, m and w block/~ if each admires the other). 
Proposition. U" [M[  Wl, then there is a woman w in W' - l l~t (M)  who has no 
admirers. 
For the proof, we need the following facts about finite sets. 
Lemma 3. Let f and g be funct ions f rom a f inite set X into a set Y where f is" bijec- 
tive. Then there is a non-empty subset A C X such that f and g are bijections f rom 
.4 to f (A ) .  
Proof.  Let h - f  J,-~g. Then h maps X into X and since X is finite and h '~+ ~(X)C 
h"(X) ,  we must have ha(X)  hk+l (X)  for some k. The set A-hk(X)  has the 
desired property. {~ 
For those familiar with the matching algorithm of [2], a very short proof of ttle material of this section 
is gixen in lhe appendix. 
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To prove the proposit ion, suppose very w in W' has an admirer and let (,~(w) be 
her favorite admirer. Applying Lemma 3 to the ['unctions c~ and it.~! gives a set ll? 
such that/aM(H/) = c.~(ff/). Now define fi to agree with a on ~,  with (z i on/a(l,{') 
and with it.~t otherwise. Now fi is stable for if (m, w) were to block fi, then w would 
be in ~ 'and  m would admire w, but wis matched byfi to her favorite admirer whom 
she therefore prefers to m. But fi is preferred to/a.~t by all m in/a(H") contradicting 
the fact that /a,~1 is M-optimal.  
Theorem 3. There is" no matching/a (stable or not such thal it >m it.w Jor  all m in 
M. 
Proof. If IMI >[WI, then the result is immediate since, in that case, at least one 
man would be matched with himself by it. If the conclusion were false, then every 
man would have to be matched under it with someone he admires trader/a,~/, but 
from the proposition there is at least one woman who no one admires under 
/a~t. F I 
6. The Dubins-Freedman Theorem 
We need the following result whose formulation is due to J.S. Hwang: 
Key Lemma. Let/a be any matching on "/' and let M '  be all/?ten who prejer  /a to 
/a.~1. Then there is a pair (m, w) which blocks it where m ~ M-  M'. 
Proof.  Case 1: it(M')--#/aM(M' ). Choose w in /a (M ' ) - i tM(M' ) ,  say, w- /a (m'L  
Then m'  admires w under/a M so w prefers/a,w(w)-m to m', and m is not in M'  
since w is not in /aM(M'), hence m prefers w to/a(m) so (m, w) blocks ~. 
Case II: 2 /a (M ' )=/aM(M' ) -  W'. We now define a preference structure y~' for 
M', W'. First, P~,~ is the same as Pm restricted to W'U {o7} for all m in M'.  For w 
in W', P~,. agrees with P,,, restricted to M 'U Iw } except that w is now ranked just 
below/a(w). In other words, the only men in M'  who are acceptable to w are those 
m such that mk,,/a(w). Note that /a M restricted to M 'U  W' is still stable for J", 
because any pair which blocks in ~"' would also block in .~'~. Letting/a,w' be the M'- 
optimal matching for ~'~', we see that/a~r >,w'/a.~, that is, there is at least one m in 
M '  who prefers ,u~4, to/aM because by hypothesis, /a >,,,/aM for all m in M'  and if 
/a.w=/a.w', this would contradict Theorem 3. We now define fi on MU W by 
fi - /aM' on M'U W', 
--/aat on (M-M' )U(W-W' ) .  
-' A shorter proof of this part of the lemma is given in the appendix for readers familiar with the match- 
ing algorithm of [2]. 
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Since/5 >,wl*~t, we know that /~ is not stable for /' so let (m, w) be the blocking 
pair. Now we cannot have (m, w) in M 'U  W' because if m was acceptable to w in 
/", then (m, w) would block/~M' and if m is not acceptable to w in y~', then by con- 
struction of P(,, w prefers 14~r(W)=fi(w) to m. Further,  if m eM'  and we W W', 
then {m, w} does not block fi because then {m, w} would block ,u.~t, since m is no 
better off  under /&l than under ft. Therefore, we must have meM-M'  and 
w e W', but then {m, w} also blocks/4w because again, by construct ion of P(,, w is 
at least as well off  under/~M' as under / , .  ~ 
Theorem 4 (Dubins-Freedman) .  Let J~ be a preference structure and let ~/' differ 
f rom /' in that some set 1171C M falsify their preferences. Then there is no matchinje 
!~, stable fo r  > which is preferred to l*.w by all members o f  :Q. 
Proof. Suppose/a  is a matching preferred to I*M by M'D:Q.  Then from the Key 
Lemma,  there is a pair (m, w) which blocks I* in '/'. But meM-M' ,  so neither m 
nor w is falsifying preferences, so {m, w] also blocks 1* in ~' so /1 is not :,>- 
stable. 
7. Appendix 
In order to make this article self-contained, we did not assume the reader was 
famil iar with the matching algor ithm of  [2]. For  those who are, the proofs of  
Theorems 3 and 4 can be considerably shortened. 
Theorem 3 (Pareto Optimal i ty) .  There is no matching which makes all the men bet- 
ter o i l  than they are tingler lt. w. 
Proof. If .u were such a matching it would match every man to some woman who 
had rejected him in the algor ithm, hence all of these women,/~(M),  would have been 
matched under l~:w, hence all of  M would have been matched under l~.~. Bul the 
last woman to get a proposal  has not rejected anyone, contradict ion.  ] 
Proof of Key l ,emma. Case 1: Same proof  as in Section 6. 
Case II: I~w(M' ) - I , (M ' ) -  W'. Let w be the last woman in W' to receive a pro- 
posal from a member of  M '  in the algor ithm. Since all w in W' have made rejections, 
we see that w had a tentative mate m when she received this last proposal .  We claim 
(m, w) is the desired blocking pair. First, m is not in M '  for if so, after having been 
rejected by w, he would have proposed again to a member of  W' contradict ing the 
fact that w received the last such proposal .  But m prefers w to his mate under l*,w 
and since he is no better off  under / , ,  he prefers w to l l(m). On the other hand, m 
was the last man in M '  to be rejected by w so she must have rejected her mate under 
u, call him m', beJbre she rejected m and hence she prefers m to m'  so (m, w) blocks 
II as claimed. 
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